Israel's Ongoing Espionage in Lebanon: Will Bibi Attack A Weakened Hezbollah?

Is it really possible that Israeli Special Forces personnel have been roaming South Lebanon undetected?

By NICHOLAS BLANFORD
NOW.
December 16, 2015

The recent discovery of several Israeli espionage devices in South Lebanon demonstrates that despite the focus on the conflict in neighboring Syria, there has been no let up in the covert intelligence war between Hezbollah and Israel.

The latest device unearthed in South Lebanon was found over the weekend near Touline in the central sector of the southern border district. It is not entirely clear what was found — the Lebanese Army did not issue a statement on the discovery and the only news came from the National News Agency, which said army engineers dismantled an “Israeli espionage device.”

On 1 December, a booby-trapped tapping device was blown up south of Marjayoun on the Bourj Mallouk-Khiam road, wounding two workmen who were installing water pipes nearby. Photographs of the scene showed a pit at least a meter deep where the device was buried, several large boxes and cables, all of which suggested an Israeli wire tapping operation in progress. The location was in view of the Israeli military outpost in Metula, three kilometers to the south, and it is likely that the Israelis chose to destroy the device by remote control before it was discovered by the approaching workmen.

Israeli troops briefly occupied the flat plain between Marjayoun and Khiam during the 2006 War, which could have afforded them cover to set up the tap if, indeed, that is when it was installed. But in recent years there have been other examples of Israeli taps on Hezbollah communications lines in areas where Israeli troops were not operating in 2006, nor even during the years of occupation before 2000 (which was before Hezbollah began installing its fiber-optic communications system).

Other than last weekend’s discovery of a device in Touline, previous tapping operations include one in Zrarieh, just north of the Litani River, near Nabatieh, which was found in July 2012. It, too, included several bulky boxes and at least 80 meters of additional connecting cable. In September 2014, Hussein Haidar, a Hezbollah engineer, was killed near Adloun when he attempted to dismantle another espionage device.

Reports at the time variously claimed it was either a surveillance device with long-range cameras and radio transmitters, similar to those discovered by the army in 2010 on the Sannine and Barouk mountains, or another fiber-optic tap.

In December 2011, an Israeli pilotless reconnaissance drone blew up a booby-trapped tapping device in a valley between Srifa and Deir Kifa in the south as a team of Hezbollah engineers, apparently having detected the interception, drew close.

There are various ways to tap into a fiber-optic cable. While it is not entirely clear which method the Israelis are using, the simplest is to clamp the cable to create micro bends that allow some of the data-conveying photons to bleed out. The amount of light diverted from the cable is minuscule but sufficient to allow the data to be interpreted.

There are also means of detecting intrusions on fiber-optic cables, including incorporating a sensor that sounds the alarm if anyone tampers with the fibers. Another method is the use of optical power monitors that detect minute fluctuations in the power level, suggesting a potential leak via a tap. An optical time-domain reflectometer is an instrument that is used to check the integrity of a length of fiber-optic cable to ensure that it is working properly. It can be used not only to detect potential taps, but also mark the location along the length of the cable. It is unclear exactly what method Hezbollah uses to detect intrusions on its communications network, but it is evident from past incidents that it has the capability to trace Israeli interceptions.

The first known discovery by Hezbollah of an Israeli tap on its lines was in October 2009 in a valley near Houla, in South Lebanon, about a kilometer from the border. A Hezbollah team walked along the valley floor and dug a hole every few meters, presumably to test the data flow on the cable, before moving on. An Israeli drone flew overhead, closely monitoring the Hezbollah team. Eventually, the team discovered the tapping device, booby-trapped with explosives, buried underground and connected to a transmitter about 10 meters away and a battery pack containing 360 individual batteries. The Hezbollah team backed away and the drone detonated the device by remote control, but only the transmitter was destroyed due to faulty explosives. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army, alerted by the blast, arrived at the scene and took pictures and studied the remaining devices. The Israelis contacted UNIFIL and warned the peacekeepers to stay away as they were still trying to destroy the evidence, which they succeeded in doing the following day.

This hidden intelligence war between Hezbollah and Israel rages on silently and only on rare occasions do examples break the surface into the public domain.

Despite Hezbollah’s technical prowess in detecting taps, the fact that the Israelis are able to conduct the interceptions in the first place exposes a flaw in the party’s operational security. The Zrarieh tap in 2012, for example, was located only a few meters from a main road on the edge of the village. The tapping devices, along with radio transmitter and battery pack, are heavy and bulky. The degree of technical capability required in finding the cable to tap, lugging heavy equipment to the location, hooking it up to the fiber and digging holes large enough to contain and hide the tapping device, transmitter and power supply, and then escape the scene unnoticed, suggests the work of highly-trained personnel rather than local Lebanese collaborators. Is it really possible that Israeli Special Forces personnel have been roaming South Lebanon undetected, planting taps on Hezbollah’s communications cables?


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Israel’s ongoing espionage in Lebanon

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