Putin’s Formula for Destabilization
By Max Boot
March 16, 2016
Commentary Magazine
What does it mean that Vladimir Putin is withdrawing the “main part” of Russia’s expeditionary force in Syria? It’s unclear because the words Putin uses are subject to interpretation — and, in any case, he has repeatedly revealed himself to be as truthful as his number one American fan, Donald J. Trump. Putin’s announcement, which like all of his acts has caught Washington by surprise, can best be understood as a proclamation that he has achieved his basic goals in Syria and feels able to ramp down his commitment — without ending it entirely.
And what are those goals? The ostensible justification for Russia’s involvement was to defeat ISIS. But less than 10 percent of Russian munitions have actually been targeted on the Islamic State. The rest have been reserved for more moderate rebels supported by the United States and our allies, for the simple reason that it is those rebels, and not ISIS, that pose the gravest threat to the survival of the Russian-Iranian client, Bashar Assad. Putin sent his aircraft and troops into Syria last fall because he did not want to risk seeing Assad toppled. But that does not mean that Putin is committed to achieving unconditional victory for Assad.
Putin is certainly enough of a realist to know that there is no way that Assad can, at acceptable cost, defeat his myriad enemies. Routing all of the insurgent factions in Syria, which include ISIS and the al-Nusra Front (an al-Qaeda affiliate), would require an Afghanistan-style invasion by Russia — something that Putin has no appetite for. Indeed, the cost of staying committed in Syria even at the current levels was made clear this week when a rebel, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile (reportedly an American-made Stinger) shot down a Russian-made MiG-21 flown by the Syrian air force. Russia’s Syria intervention has also further aggravated the international community, making it harder for European states and the U.S. to relax the sanctions they clamped on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine.
In his foreign adventures, Putin has revealed an impressive grasp of how to maximize his gains while minimizing his risk. In Ukraine, he has relied on proxy forces augmented by a relatively small number of ostensibly off-duty Russian soldiers (“the little green men”) backed up by Russian tanks and artillery. In Syria, he has relied on Iranian, and Assadist proxy forces backed up by Russian aircraft and a relatively small number of Russian troops. While President Obama has been afraid to get too involved in either Ukraine or Syria, making it impossible for the U.S. to achieve its basic aims in either country, Putin has delivered a master class in how to manage a military intervention smartly (if also immorally).
Part of Putin’s shrewdness is knowing when to be content with limited goals. In neither Ukraine in nor Syria has he pressed toward unconditional victory — the inevitable American impulse. He has been content to extend and defend Russia’s sphere of influence while leaving the rest of both countries in other hands. In Syria’s case, that means essentially leaving a patchwork of cantonments that are never likely to be reassembled into a unitary state. Assad and ISIS control large chunks of land on either side of Syria — Assad in the east, ISIS in the west. The Kurds control a growing sphere of influence in the north — the budding state of Rojava – along the Turkish border. In the north, around Aleppo, and in the south, around Daraa, various rebel groups hold sway. No individual group is able to rule the entire country. And while that may be a tragedy to Syrian patriots, to Putin it is an opportunity to be exploited.
The Russian autocrat specializes in creating “frozen” conflicts. In Georgia, Moscow supports the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; in Moldova, Transnistria; in Ukraine, the renegade provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk along with the now-annexed Crimea. Add to these the Assad state in Syria which controls a narrow strip of territory in the east running from Damascus to Latakia along the Mediterranean coast, which is home to a Russian airbase that looks to be a permanent fixture. Putin’s goal in peace talks in Geneva will perpetuate this status quo indefinitely. As long as Assad retains at least this much authority, Russia will be able to project power into the Middle East and stymie American efforts to (in Moscow’s thinking) dominate the region.
It goes without saying that this also means the continuance of a terrible tragedy for the Syrian people as well as nearby states. A civil war that may already have killed nearly half a million people, and made millions more into refugees, will continue — and terrible tyrants such as Assad and ISIS will continue to rule a substantial part of Syria’s territory. But Putin couldn’t care less. As long as Russia appears powerful, he is satisfied, in no small part because power projection outside his territory — spun into a glorious military victory by the compliant, Kremlin-controlled media — helps him to keep power within Russia. You can almost see why Trump admires Putin so much: Putin does appear “strong” (the highest term of praise in the Donald’s lexicon) compared to Obama, who once again looks weak. Only if you inject considerations of morality (as alien to Trump as to Putin) would you realize that Putin is hardly an admirable leader or a model worth emulating.
What does it mean that Vladimir Putin is withdrawing the “main part” of Russia’s expeditionary force in Syria? It’s unclear because the words Putin uses are subject to interpretation — and, in any case, he has repeatedly revealed himself to be as truthful as his number one American fan, Donald J. Trump. Putin’s announcement, which like all of his acts has caught Washington by surprise, can best be understood as a proclamation that he has achieved his basic goals in Syria and feels able to ramp down his commitment — without ending it entirely.
And what are those goals? The ostensible justification for Russia’s involvement was to defeat ISIS. But less than 10 percent of Russian munitions have actually been targeted on the Islamic State. The rest have been reserved for more moderate rebels supported by the United States and our allies, for the simple reason that it is those rebels, and not ISIS, that pose the gravest threat to the survival of the Russian-Iranian client, Bashar Assad. Putin sent his aircraft and troops into Syria last fall because he did not want to risk seeing Assad toppled. But that does not mean that Putin is committed to achieving unconditional victory for Assad.
Putin is certainly enough of a realist to know that there is no way that Assad can, at acceptable cost, defeat his myriad enemies. Routing all of the insurgent factions in Syria, which include ISIS and the al-Nusra Front (an al-Qaeda affiliate), would require an Afghanistan-style invasion by Russia — something that Putin has no appetite for. Indeed, the cost of staying committed in Syria even at the current levels was made clear this week when a rebel, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile (reportedly an American-made Stinger) shot down a Russian-made MiG-21 flown by the Syrian air force. Russia’s Syria intervention has also further aggravated the international community, making it harder for European states and the U.S. to relax the sanctions they clamped on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine.
In his foreign adventures, Putin has revealed an impressive grasp of how to maximize his gains while minimizing his risk. In Ukraine, he has relied on proxy forces augmented by a relatively small number of ostensibly off-duty Russian soldiers (“the little green men”) backed up by Russian tanks and artillery. In Syria, he has relied on Iranian, and Assadist proxy forces backed up by Russian aircraft and a relatively small number of Russian troops. While President Obama has been afraid to get too involved in either Ukraine or Syria, making it impossible for the U.S. to achieve its basic aims in either country, Putin has delivered a master class in how to manage a military intervention smartly (if also immorally).
Part of Putin’s shrewdness is knowing when to be content with limited goals. In neither Ukraine in nor Syria has he pressed toward unconditional victory — the inevitable American impulse. He has been content to extend and defend Russia’s sphere of influence while leaving the rest of both countries in other hands. In Syria’s case, that means essentially leaving a patchwork of cantonments that are never likely to be reassembled into a unitary state. Assad and ISIS control large chunks of land on either side of Syria — Assad in the east, ISIS in the west. The Kurds control a growing sphere of influence in the north — the budding state of Rojava – along the Turkish border. In the north, around Aleppo, and in the south, around Daraa, various rebel groups hold sway. No individual group is able to rule the entire country. And while that may be a tragedy to Syrian patriots, to Putin it is an opportunity to be exploited.
The Russian autocrat specializes in creating “frozen” conflicts. In Georgia, Moscow supports the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; in Moldova, Transnistria; in Ukraine, the renegade provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk along with the now-annexed Crimea. Add to these the Assad state in Syria which controls a narrow strip of territory in the east running from Damascus to Latakia along the Mediterranean coast, which is home to a Russian airbase that looks to be a permanent fixture. Putin’s goal in peace talks in Geneva will perpetuate this status quo indefinitely. As long as Assad retains at least this much authority, Russia will be able to project power into the Middle East and stymie American efforts to (in Moscow’s thinking) dominate the region.
It goes without saying that this also means the continuance of a terrible tragedy for the Syrian people as well as nearby states. A civil war that may already have killed nearly half a million people, and made millions more into refugees, will continue — and terrible tyrants such as Assad and ISIS will continue to rule a substantial part of Syria’s territory. But Putin couldn’t care less. As long as Russia appears powerful, he is satisfied, in no small part because power projection outside his territory — spun into a glorious military victory by the compliant, Kremlin-controlled media — helps him to keep power within Russia. You can almost see why Trump admires Putin so much: Putin does appear “strong” (the highest term of praise in the Donald’s lexicon) compared to Obama, who once again looks weak. Only if you inject considerations of morality (as alien to Trump as to Putin) would you realize that Putin is hardly an admirable leader or a model worth emulating.
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